CESR
Central Eurasian Studies Review

Publication of the Central Eurasian Studies Society

ISSN 1538-5043 (Print)
ISSN 1543-7817 (Electronic)

Contents of this issue

Volume 3, Number 2 Spring 2004

Editors - CESR Vol. 3 No. 2

Chief Editors: Marianne Kamp (Laramie, Wyo., USA), Virginia Martin (Huntsville, Ala., USA)
Section Editors:
Perspectives: Robert M. Cutler (Ottawa/Montreal, Canada), Edward Walker (Berkeley, Calif., USA)
Research Reports and Briefs: Ed Schatz (Carbondale, Ill., USA), Jamilya Ukudeeva (Aptos, Calif., USA)
Reviews and Abstracts: Shoshana Keller (Clinton, N.Y., USA), Resul Yalcin (London, England)
Conferences and Lecture Series: Peter Finke (Halle/Salle, Germany), Payam Foroughi (Salt Lake City, Utah, USA)
Educational Resources and Developments: Philippe Forét (Zurich, Switzerland), Daniel C. Waugh (Seattle, Wash., USA)
Copy Editor: Michael Davis (Kirksville, Mo., USA)
English Language Style Editor: Helen Faller (Ann Arbor, Mich., USA)
Production Editor: Sada Aksartova (Washington, D.C., USA)
Web Editor: Paola Raffetta (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Indexer: Charles Kolb (Washington, D.C., USA)
Editorial and Production Consultant: John Schoeberlein (Cambridge, Mass., USA)

[Contents]

Perspectives

Eurasian Studies in Turkey

Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, Director, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, aayatametu.edu.tr; Hayriye Kahveci, Research Assistant, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, hkahvecimetu.edu.tr; and Işık Kuşçu, Research Assistant, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, isikkuscuyahoo.com

The break-up of the Soviet Union initiated vast changes in academic studies in Turkey. This paper examines the changes occurring specifically in studies in the social sciences. It traces the recent development of Eurasian studies in Turkey and explains how the shift occurred from a dominant ideological approach to one based on objective scholarly study. It indicates how this shift, accompanied by an increase of students with advanced training in Central Eurasian affairs, has transformed not only academic institutions in Turkey's universities and developments in the social sciences in the country, but also state and non-state policy-research institutions. It shows how the interaction among these different types of institutions influenced their respective research agendas. All these developments have increased Turkey's profile within the international social science community. The country's cultural and historical interests have facilitated intensive interdisciplinary research activity within Turkey as well as active international scholarly cooperation with institutions in the region, and with institutions and researchers internationally.

Academic Studies

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the interests of Turkish specialists in Central Eurasia were more ideological than empirical. Notwithstanding this fact, significant anecdotal knowledge was accumulated, as people of Turkic origins immigrating to Turkey provided an important source of information. However, their experiences were strongly tainted by anti-communism and Russophobia. Systematic academic interest in the region remained limited, and the dominant publications were written by several ideologically-oriented groups, particularly pan-Turanian nationalists. A long tradition of pan-Turanianism in Turkey gave great emphasis to the study of the Turkic peoples within the Soviet Union, who, it was asserted, experienced dramatic oppression, acculturation and enforced migration, and the violation of basic human rights. However, this interest was limited mainly to the disciplines of literature and history, where the relevant texts were relatively more accessible. The inaccessibility of the Soviet Union to Turkish social scientists strongly contributed to the paucity both of interest in the region and of knowledge about it among groups with other ideological orientations. At the same time, Turkey's official foreign policy of non-intervention and non-irredentism discouraged serious research.

During the first post-Soviet years, the evolution of Turkish studies on Central Eurasia, and Central Asia in particular, was strongly influenced by the climate of opinion among Western and especially American elites, and was characterized by uncertainty in the international environment. Discussions among academic and political decision-makers and opinion-leaders focused on whether Turkey could be a development model for the newly independent states, especially those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which have longstanding historical and cultural ties with Turkey itself. It was hoped that Turkey, with its secular state and Western-style market economy, could assume such a role and so diminish residual Russian influence in the region while at the same time preventing the newly independent states from drawing close to such states as Iran. So in the early 1990s, the Western powers encouraged and promoted Turkey's search for enhanced political influence in the region. Similarly, states in Central Asia and the Caucasus favored close and cooperative relations with Turkey, which they presumed to be a gateway to the Western world. Thus all three - the West, the states in the region and Turkey - looked forward to enhanced Turkish involvement in Central Eurasia.

The regional dynamics of Turkish foreign policy were strongly shaped by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Turkey became anxious that its role in Western eyes as a "frontline" state in the Cold War might diminish. On the other hand, Turkey's international role became enhanced, thanks to cultural and historical ties with the region, and especially the newly independent Turkic states. Researchers in Turkey enthusiastically welcomed this new atmosphere, and their new work reflected this emphasis.

The interests of Turkish scholars in the region developed in parallel with the changes in Turkish foreign policy. Cultural, historical and linguistic ties made this part of the world attractive for the Turkish academics, especially among the young, who were excited by the rapid changes in contemporary history. Moreover, researchers in Turkey easily acquired the languages spoken in the region due to their linguistic similarity to Turkish. All this facilitated rapid growth in studies of the region and their peoples by Turkish scholars. This review surveys the evolution of Turkish academic interest in Eurasian studies in general and Central Asian and Caucasian studies in particular. Two features attract special interest: first, the themes of dissertations dealing with the region that were defended in Turkish universities; and second, the development of Eurasian studies in Turkish universities, as reflected in the proliferation of courses of studies and research centers devoted to the field.

The distribution of dissertations concerning Central Eurasia across scholarly fields of study is an especially useful indicator of shifts in the sociology of knowledge. Dissertation topics represent the interests of the newest scholars and therefore also have predictive value for the future evolution of scientific work. Also, the topics are chosen under the supervision of recognized authorities in the field and so reflect their evaluation of which topics will be most relevant in the sociology of knowledge of the near-term future. Using data from the search engine of the Turkish Board of Higher Education, one can profile the remarkable change taking place in Turkish academia. Table 1 depicts the growth of subject areas in which dissertations concerning Central Eurasia were defended in Turkish universities. Over the past decade and a half an increase both in the variety of topics and in the numbers of dissertations is clear from Table 1. There are four main periods from 1987 through 2001.

At the end of the Soviet period, 1987-1991, history was the only discipline in which dissertations concerning Central Eurasia were defended. During a second phase, 1992-1994, some dissertations were defended on historical and literary topics, but in the main these years mark a transition in the disciplines concerned with the region. Economics, foreign policy, and international politics began to be represented. Among the particular topics addressed were the possibilities for economic cooperation between Turkey and the newly independent states, and the question of Turkey as a development model for the newly independent states. Such topics were very much in line with Turkish foreign policy.

Ankara's enthusiasm for the renaissance of Turkic states of Central Eurasia found expression in 1992 through the creation of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TICA was explicitly conceived and designed as an instrument for channeling aid and investment to Turkic states. It sponsored frequent visits by specialists between Turkey and the newly independent states, and Turkey made promises to support many projects. The relative prosperity of Turkey's national economy during the first half of the 1990s also made it possible to grant a significant level of export-import credits. Turkey investigated the possibilities for assisting the newly independent states' transition to a market economy and TICA created some programs for this purpose. One of the biggest projects was in the sphere of education, where a newly created program was capable of receiving 10,000 students from the region into Turkey over the course of five years.

All these developments increased Central Eurasian studies in Turkish universities. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, Turkish interest in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus was characterized mainly by exploration of the possibilities for Turkey's new role in the international system in general and the regional subsystem of international relations in particular, as well as by the kinds of cooperative relations that could be established with other Turkic countries and peoples. This emphasis changed as a result of recognizing the limits of the role that Turkey could play.

The data in Table 1 also reflect this change of emphasis. Thus, a third period from 1995 through 1998 shows decreased attention to the traditional areas of history and language/literature but also to such general descriptive topics as "the possibilities of economic cooperation between Turkey and the region" or "Turkey as a development model." From 1995 onwards dissertation topics ranged from literature to economics, politics to taxation, banking systems to education systems. Dissertations addressed specific questions concerning the problems of economic transition to a market economy and prospects for political transition to a democratic state characterized by the rule of law, in addition to such specific features as public administration. These were years of blossoming academic interest in the region. Not only a diversification in dissertation topics among various disciplines characterized the years after 1995; there was also an increasing level of country-specific research, due in part to the need for such specialized knowledge in the service of Turkey's enhanced economic and technical cooperation with countries in the region. Finally, during a fourth period, from 1999 onwards, there is a qualitatively and quantitatively still greater proliferation in both the number and diversity of topics.

In the 1990s, Central Eurasian studies saw not just the development of new fields of knowledge in Turkey but also a new stage in the development of social science research in the country at large. Until very recently, area studies in Turkey were limited to research on the Middle East, mainly because of the Ottoman heritage. These works naturally stressed the traditional disciplines of history and language/ literature. However, the proliferation of Central Eurasian studies into Turkish scholarly life in general and the social sciences in particular has led to a markedly increased emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches to regional studies. Likewise, the field of international relations is developing as an autonomous interdisciplinary field, no longer limited to theoretical discussions of dominant political science paradigms such as realism and its critiques. The failure of political scientists to predict the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised the importance of area studies and of alternative theoretical approaches.

Two other disciplines benefiting significantly from the growth of Central Eurasian studies in Turkey are sociology and anthropology. Anthropology in Turkey had always been particularly weak because Turkish social scientists had neither resources nor professional incentives for studying other societies. But the new situation offered opportunities for young scholars. Possibilities opened up both for the Turkish government and for Turkish academics through the joint creation of universities in countries other than Turkey, such as Ahmed Yasevi Türk Kazak University in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Türkiye Manas University in Kyrgyzstan. Some young scholars, supported by university resources and scholarships, traveled and lived in the area, learning the languages, living with the people, and applying anthropological methods in their work there. Similarly in sociology and political science, comparative studies proliferated and the study of other societies became an accepted part of the curriculum in many of the more selective Turkish universities, which was not the case even a decade and a half ago.

Up to that time, the social sciences in Turkey, in contrast to many other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, did not include the tradition of studying other societies. Living in another country to study its society, economy and politics, learning its language, and developing a scientific perspective were uncommon. Many of the students who in the 1990s went to Central Eurasian countries to study these societies were not only pioneers in the opening-up of this field of inquiry but also, without exaggeration, makers of intellectual history within their own disciplines. Needless to say, these developments also had the very significant result of giving Turkish social scientists an opportunity to develop more comparative perspectives on domestic Turkish affairs and issue areas of Turkish policy and society. For a country such as Turkey, lying at the intersection of so many regional subsystems in international politics, that comparative approach is especially important for overcoming parochial views and achieving broader generalization and relevance.

Research Centers

The establishment of university-based research centers with a scholarly interest in Eurasia (including Russia) has contributed to the quality and quantity of academic work. From the mid-1990s onward, area research centers and institutes were established in Turkey; at present, there are ten such research centers active in Turkish universities.

As Table 2 illustrates, many of the research centers emphasize the study of the Turkic world, especially the history of the Turkic peoples as well as their languages and literatures. Indeed, many of the courses offered are in the departments of history and of Turkish language and literature. Altogether, Turkish universities offer a total of 332 courses in Eurasian studies. Among these, 109 are in history, 175 in Turkic languages and literature, 34 in political science and international relations, and 14 in the only degree program dedicated to Eurasian studies, which is at Middle East Technical University (METU). It is noteworthy that of the 48 courses in disciplines other than history and language/literature, 21 are offered by METU. Language and literature courses emphasize the teaching of various Turkic languages, such as Chaghatay, Göktürk, Oghuz, Azeri, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Kazakh, etc. The Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Hacettepe University offers the most courses, with 21 on different Turkic dialects or languages and comparative linguistics. Kafkas University ranks first in courses offered in the history of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia.

An interdisciplinary emphasis is to be found only at recently established research centers such as the Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA, or Karadeniz ve Orta Asya Ülkeleri Araştırma Merkezi) at METU. KORA's MA Program in Eurasian studies remains the only graduate program in Turkey that emphasizes the Eurasian region and uses a multidisciplinary approach. KORA's mission includes developing relations with scientific and economic organizations in Central Eurasia as well as outside it, coordinating and motivating technical cooperation with countries in the region, establishing and administering faculty and student exchange between METU and Central Eurasian academic institutions, and facilitating fieldwork and international cooperation in both scholarly and practical spheres.

Policy Research

Government development agencies and private think-tanks have also carried out research on Central Eurasia over the past decade. As noted above, the Turkish International Cooperation Administration (TICA, formerly the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) deserves special attention. Mention will also be made of a representative foreign ministry policy-planning organ, the Strategic Research Center, and of one of the more notable recently established private think-tanks, the Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM).

TICA is not the only Turkish governmental institution pertinent to Central Eurasia, but it is the only one directly covering the region. In the first years following its creation as the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its projects concerned the basic needs of the newly independent states, including the purchase of various types of equipment. Since 1999, it has carried out its program of action as a separate state ministry rather than as a branch under the foreign ministry; in 2001, its name was changed to the Turkish International Cooperation Administration. Its mission is mainly defined as promoting economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational cooperation with developing countries in general, with priority to be given to those where Turkic languages are spoken, in regions close to Turkey.

Table 2 - Notes. Courses, Research Centers and Institutes for Eurasian Studies in Turkey (A) Research Center on the Turkic World (B) Institute on the Turkic World (C) Graduate Programs on Turkic Languages, Literature, History and Folklore (D) Center for Applied Research on the Turkic World (E) Center for Applied Economic and Social Research on the Black Sea Region, the Turkic Republics, and the Balkans (F) Research Center on the Turkic World and on Strategy) (G) Turkic Research Center (H) Research Center for the Caucasus and Central Asia (I) Research Center for the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian States (J) Turkic Research Center (K) Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) (L) MA Program in Eurasian Studies (M) Center for Russian Studies

Developing in parallel with trends in Turkish foreign policy, TICA's activities by the mid-1990s acquired a more specific and practical basis. In particular, TICA has contributed to the development of democracy and free market economies in Central Eurasia and has opened new horizons in Turkish foreign policy. Its main mission evolved to focus on technical assistance and development projects seeking to improve and empower the institutional and administrative structures in the countries concerned. This included training of personnel in the banking and insurance sectors, the developing of structures of administration to encourage economic competition, assisting in the drafting legal codes, and enhancing the competence of local administrative bodies. TICA also provided technical assistance for the development of the agricultural sector, small and medium enterprises, transportation and infrastructure, as well as tourism and services. Since the mid-1990s, TICA has provided support to scholars and to academic research in the framework of its cultural and educational projects, including its "Supporting the Research of Turkish Scholars Project" conducted in association with KORA, which enables scholars to do field research.

A study of the activities of Turkish public institutions from 1992 through 2001 revealed that of the aid given, 25% was in the form of social aid, 58% in the form of technical aid, and 17% in the form of financial aid. Economic cooperation accounted for 9.3% of all cooperation, trade cooperation 7.6%, technical cooperation 15.0%, social cooperation 12.4%, cultural cooperation 52.4%, and education cooperation 3.3%. Table 3 indicates the number of projects undertaken by Turkish governmental institutions as a whole during that decade. The year 1995 marks a significant increase in these practical cooperation activities, just as it marks a new phase in the quantity and quality of academic work, as indexed by dissertation topics.

The traumatic economic crisis experienced in Turkey during the second half of the 1990s, which occurred independently of the developments under discussion, created problems in the country's cooperation with the Central Eurasian states even as its accomplishments and successes became manifest, including the accumulation of knowledge and expertise over time. Yet, aside from economic issues, problems in cooperation also arose for other reasons. It is necessary to acknowledge that there was a lack of coordination among the Turkish governmental institutions concerned with these cooperative projects. Thus, different institutions often undertook similar activities, repeating one another's mistakes and failing to achieve the desired results. Also, some of the projects proposed for the region were simply not feasible, due in part but not solely to Turkey's relative lack of experience in extending and administering technical assistance. (This problem has diminished over time through the training efforts of such institutions as the Japan International Cooperation Agency and Canadian International Development Agency.) Finally, it is clear that changes in the government in power at a given time can directly affect the successful implementation of a project.

Table 4 summarizes the areas in which TICA has executed projects in the region. For example, TICA offered substantial resources to projects in the areas of culture and history. A broad Turkology program involved assisting in the creation and development of Turkology departments in universities in Central Asia, facilitating the travel of Turkish scholars to lecture there, and identifying and administering restoration projects of historical significance. More recently, TICA's core mission has focused on training and consultation activities within economic and administrative projects. Here, the administrative and institutional experiences of the Turkish Republic provided an excellent basis for training personnel in different sectors such as banking, insurance, promoting free-market competition, and so forth.

Given the above-mentioned intellectual climate in Turkey prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, including a basic lack of trained personnel, it will not be a surprise that neither government structures nor civil society had research centers devoted to analytical study of questions of international relations. It is worth mentioning two such research centers that have appeared on the scene since then.

First, the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1995 to conduct research in international affairs and regional studies. It acts as a consultative body of the foreign ministry, with the aim of providing objective analyses of foreign policy issues for those in the policy-making structures. SAM benefits from participation by academics and scholars from prominent Turkish universities. It upholds its mission also by organizing seminars, conferences and panels for discussion and debate. Proceedings of some of these sessions are published in open-source (i.e., not classified or secret) periodicals.

Second, the private think-tank Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM) was established in 1999, with the mission of carrying out systematic and scientific, interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research on the region. ASAM has a number of regional research divisions including departments on Russia and Ukraine, on the Caucasus, on the Balkans, and on Turkistan (Central Asia and western China). ASAM likewise organizes conferences and publishes books and periodicals in its field of competence.

Conclusion

On at least three counts, the emergence of Central Eurasian studies as a field in Turkish social science has had a positive effect on both Turkey and the region. First, throughout the last decade, academic cooperation between the Central Eurasian countries and Turkey has increased. Relations have developed more systematically, in a value-neutral manner detached from the emotional distortion that often characterized works in the field in the past. On a practical level, this has led relations between Turkey and the newly independent Turkic states to develop with more clearly defined goals. Second, Turkey's influence in the region compared to what it was during the Soviet era has risen dramatically, mainly thanks to student exchanges and Turkish entrepreneurs active in the region. Third, the proliferation of Eurasian studies in Turkey has driven the creation of a previously nonexistent technical bureaucracy dedicated to extending technical aid and cooperation with other countries.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that Turkey has made appreciable contributions to the development of scholarly studies about Central Eurasia. It has developed a fast-growing academic community characterized by a variety of research interests. This academic community is especially important in the international context because of its cultural, linguistic, and geographical propinquity to the region. Turkey itself is a natural bridge between scholars in the region and in the West, and this fact will both broaden and deepen future scholarship on Central Eurasian studies in the country and internationally.

[Contents]

Research Reports

Narratives of Migration and Kazakh Identity

Saulesh Yessenova, Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, sauleshinterchange.ubc.ca

Following the downturn of the "transitional" economy in Kazakhstan, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh villagers left their homes for urban areas. In my research, I examined the notions of identity, ancestry, and the nation that emerged in the narratives of recent rural to urban migrants in Almaty. Special attention was paid to how their experiences of displacement and adjustment to their new environment have been systematically misconstrued in urban mass media and social analysis in a fashion that resonates with the colonial rhetoric of the Soviet regime.

For this study, I conducted twelve months of fieldwork in 1999 (January-December), followed by return trips in 2000, 2001, and 2002. My interviews with Kazakh men and women who arrived in Almaty after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 formed my main method for collecting data. I purposefully sought to include in my sample migrants from different regions of Kazakhstan. I wanted to find out how regional and ancestral attachments play out in the context of urban migration to Almaty and whether patterns of migration and adaptation in urban environments resonated with national discourses. To incorporate voices from different locales, I made side trips to Astana, as well as Atïrau and Shïmkent, and visited two villages in Almaty and Zhambïl Provinces. Finally, through personal communication and analysis of Kazakh- and Russian-language media and scholarly literature, I collected opinions among second generation and old-time Kazakh urban residents, which allowed me to incorporate their perspectives concerning rural-to-urban migration in my research.

By focusing on my informants' migration to the city, I was particularly interested in learning their family situations (past and present), their decision-making concerning their arrival to the city and subsequent arrangements, their strategies for finding housing and jobs in Almaty, as well as their social relations in the city and across the urban/rural divide. In addition to oral narratives that I collected by means of unstructured and semi-structured interviews, I carried out a cognitive network analysis.

This network analysis helped me to reconstruct (at least partially) 28 migrants' communities in the city built around my informants' family members, kinspeople, and fellow villagers who were also co-habitants, neighbors, and/or co-workers. The migrant community may also include other individuals with whom former villagers have spontaneously reconnected in the city, as well as those whom they have recently met and to whom they are related occupationally, residentially, and/or by virtue of shared aspirations and interests. Through reestablished connections and new acquaintances recent arrivals get access to other migrant communities. These operate in the city and across the rural/urban divide; they are not isolated networks but form extended chains of contacts that help to address migrants' needs for services and comfort. These communities and their social connections formed a migrant "frontier zone" that emerged in Almaty after 1991.

Subsequently, I used a narrative method as a strategy of analysis, so that my discussion was organized around case studies formed on the basis of my informants' testimonies. This method was an effective way to foreground migrants' voices, which need to be heard and integrated into social and cultural analyses on post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

By focusing on recent urban migrants' own understanding of their social world and locating their narratives within a broader urban context, I argue that Kazakh identity, generally understood to be based on the idea of common descent, has been continuously reevaluated under the stress of the post-socialist transitional period. What seems to be an outcome of this reevaluation is the formation within the nation of particular spaces "in-between," where the ethnic name is consistently "hyphenated," such as "being Kazakh and being rural" as opposed to "being Kazakh and being urban." Based on two distinct sets of motives, predicates, and expectations (both originating in the ambivalence of the transitional position of their bearers in the nationalizing society and the globalizing world), these two perspectives, urban and rural, shape two sets of subjectivities caught in enduring opposition, building grounds for new forms of collective identities. As part of this argument, I trace how the rhetorical image of recent urban migrants' "otherness" - they are described in urban discourses as confused and resentful inhabitants of urban slums, who find it easy to engage in excessive alcohol and drug abuse, violence, and crime - enters the practical domain of social relationships in the city.

The claims of rural/urban identity manifest unequal power relations within the nation, echoing developmental discrepancies between the city and the village during socialism and thereafter. My argument here is that the legacy of this inequality allows the urban populace to exercise power over former villagers' images of the rural/urban difference, which they communicate to the larger world. By systematically misconstruing their experiences of displacement and adjustment to their new environment, these images depict former villagers as an obstacle in the society's transition from the Soviet state to a more advanced collective state of being. The fashion in which these images are structured resonates with the colonial rhetoric of the Soviet regime, defining Kazakh society as archaic, inferior, and, therefore, incapable of modern nationhood and self-governance. I demonstrate this contention with a reference to the work of several Kazakh social scientists who ascribe to migrants a sociocentric ("clan") orientation, which, they claim, has its origins in the outdated "tribal" ideology of the Kazakh nomadic past and still characterizes the social environment of the Kazakh countryside.

By juxtaposing migrants' personal testimonies with urban discourses that reflect more privileged standpoints, I have been able to undertake a more nuanced analysis of Kazakh culture, identity, and society in the post-socialist urban milieu, which I have located within broader historical and theoretical contexts. Ultimately, attention to local meanings and engagements has made clear the flaws of existing analytical frameworks.

First, attention to local meanings highlights Kazakhs' agency - something that is downplayed in usual approaches. Much Western literature argues that Soviet authorities had defined the republics' political borders as well as Kazakh ethnic boundaries on the basis of their own considerations and to the best of their knowledge; in this view, the Soviet state was exclusively responsible for the ethnic/national imagination developed among the Kazakhs later in the century. This framework, figuring Kazakh ethnic identity as merely imposed on the society by the Soviet regime, appears to be too simplistic.1 It downplays the role of local efforts to define Kazakh ethnic identity within the realities of a Kazakh cultural repertoire, especially genealogy and the idea of common origins both stemming from the shezhire, historical narratives articulating ancestral ties. And as a result, it fails to make sense of postsocialist ambiguity and contestation within Kazakh society.

Second, attention to local meanings problematizes simplistic primordialist views on identity. A second influential framework, which was also picked up by Kazakh scholars in socialism's aftermath, produced narratives that, using Chatterjee's phrase, "continue to run along channels excavated by colonial discourse" (Chatterjee 1993: 224). Here, Kazakh identity was understood through the prism of social divisions into tribes and clans transplanted fairly unchanged from the past into the present-day culture and social reality, fueling and being fueled by underdevelopment, especially in rural areas. The problem with this approach is that, by following the lines of functional analysis, it fails to recognize that the shezhire may only seem to represent some sort of "a long established pattern of values," which in turn "implies a rigid mental outlook or rigid social institutions," as Mary Douglas (1969: 4-5) insisted in her critique of a materialist treatment of religion. We cannot simply assume that social/ethnic processes in Kazakh society form a practical image of the ordering principles suggested in the shezhire. In the context of post-socialist rural to urban migration, invocations of the shezhire convey migrants' experiences of migration, distance, belonging, shaping their sense of self, negotiation of family relations, and how they construe their ethnic universe. In this sense, the assumption of Kazakh roots deriving from the shezhire is a narrative reconstruction of their routes in time and space that helps them to make sense of their experiences and links them to larger collectivities from family to the nation.

References

Chatterjee, Partha

1993 The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Douglas, Mary

1969 Purity and Danger. London: Routledge.

Esenova [Yessenova], Saulesh

2002 "Soviet nationality, identity, and ethnicity in Central Asia: historic narratives and Kazakh ethnic identity," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22 (1) 12-36.

[Contents]

Uzbek Communities in the Kyrgyz Republic and Their Relationship to Uzbekistan

Matteo Fumagalli, PhD Candidate, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, m.fumagallisms.ed.ac.uk

Identity politics has gained new salience in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The newly established polities, in most cases achieving unexpected independence, had to replace Soviet identity with alternative constructs. The fragmentation of the former Soviet space has often left ethnic groups scattered across the newly established borders, and the accommodation of cultural and political allegiances in multiethnic countries has become a central challenge to state- and nation-building in the Central Eurasian region.

In my doctoral research I explain the process of ethno-political mobilization among Uzbeks living outside the Republic of Uzbekistan. Particular focus is on mobilization strategies, modes of action, and relations between Uzbeks and Uzbek organizations on the one side, and state and supra-state actors on the other. I decided to focus on "Uzbeks abroad" for two reasons. First, the way an ethnic minority relates to the state of residence and country where the majority of co-ethnics are concentrated (kin country) carries high salience for state and nation building processes. Minority groups may pursue different strategies vis-à-vis the state of residence, ranging from "loyalty" to "exit" and "voice," to use the typology conceptualized by Albert O. Hirschman (1970). The behavior of minority groups tends to be influenced by the approach (inclusive or exclusive) adopted by the institutions of the state where they live. This is a dynamic and multidirectional relationship rather than a unidirectional one. In fact, group strategies and behavior influence state policies and possibly modify the way the state frames its relations with the group. In the case of stranded minorities, an equally important relation is that between the minority group and the kin country. Minorities can construct their identity as members of a diaspora[1] emphasizing their links with cross-border communities, or they can adopt different strategies privileging integration with the state of residence. Alternatively, the kin country can also adopt an active diaspora policy or decide to ignore co-ethnics altogether.[2] In sum, understanding how this set of relations develops can shed light on the strategies of mobilization adopted by the group (organizations), the rationale behind them, and their impact on state- and nation-building.

The second reason for my focus on Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan is that the issue of cross-border minorities, especially the so-called Russian diaspora, has caught increasing scholarly attention over the past decade (Kolstø 2001, Laitin 1998, Melvin 1995, Zevelev 2001), but the dynamics of identity formation among cross-border Uzbeks in post-Soviet Central Asia have rarely been the object of research (Liu 2002, Megoran 2002). Field reports and studies on Uzbekistan's path to independence (Bohr 1998; Melvin 2000) primarily emphasize the security implications of Uzbekistan's behavior towards "Uzbeks abroad," and the geopolitical significance of the latter.[3] However unlikely it might seem at the moment, the possibility that Uzbeks might act as a "fifth column" of Uzbekistan has raised concern in the Kyrgyz Republic, and brought the under-studied question of cross-border Uzbeks to international attention.[4]

Research Content, Questions, and Methods

In this report I discuss the preliminary findings of my study of how Uzbek communities in the Kyrgyz Republic relate to the kin country, the Republic of Uzbekistan. I present findings on two issues: Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks' perception of Uzbekistan as kin country and/or ancestral homeland of the Uzbek people, and their political assessment of Uzbekistani policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. During interviews I asked the following questions: What is your homeland? What is Uzbekistan to you? Does Uzbekistan defend the interests of its co-ethnics in the Kyrgyz Republic? How do you rate Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz Republic? Who should defend the interests of the Uzbek population?

The findings are based on fieldwork that I conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic in June and July 2003. Research was conducted in the southern Kyrgyzstani provinces of Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken, where the Uzbek populations are concentrated. Additional data were collected in Bishkek from members of the political elite who are also deputies either in the Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyzstan's National Parliament), or in the Kyrgyzstan People's Assembly (the consultative body established as a forum for the country's nationalities). I selected the cities for the study on the basis of both demographic concentration of the Uzbek population and the political significance of the location in the country (i.e., Osh is the country's southern capital, and Jalalabad is the center of the eponymous province and the area where Uzbek organizations are traditionally active). The sample consists of 140 respondents selected from the local political, economic, and cultural elite.[5]

To overcome the political sensitivity of my research subject I used reputational and purposive selection methods to identify potential respondents. The initial respondents referred me to additional respondents. This selection process carried the risk of producing a skewed sample since respondents might point to acquaintances with similar characteristics. However, this was rarely the case, and overall I achieved a sample covering diverse views on the topics investigated. I concentrate on elites rather than common people, or a combination of the two. Although I do not consider masses as irrelevant or "mere followers" in mobilizational processes, I view elites as key actors, whose access to material (e.g., money and technology) and intangible resources (e.g., loyalties and skills) enables them to mobilize masses and act as "ethnic entrepreneurs." Jones Luong also holds that studying elites is particularly enlightening in societies undergoing transformation, as they occupy a crucial place in the state structure and the decision-making process (2002: 23). Understanding their behavior and rationale allows scholars to explain the mechanisms of political change.

In the early stages of my research I designed interviews and surveys in the Russian language for three reasons. First, I am more fluent in Russian than Uzbek. Second, I needed to avoid linguistic problems that I encountered in May 2003 while conducting a seminar on nationalism for the Open Society Institute in Tashkent. The seminar was in English with simultaneous translation into Uzbek, and the translation of some common terms such as nationality or self-consciousness generated problems and disagreement. Third, when I moved to Kyrgyzstan I found that some Uzbek respondents, especially among the political elite, were more fluent in Russian than Uzbek. Although the use of Uzbek is highly promoted in Uzbekistan among the academic community and high-ranking officials, that is not the case within Uzbek communities of neighboring countries, where Russian constitutes the lingua franca (official or not).[6] All in all, the choice of Russian did not present drawbacks.

Research was divided into two stages. The first stage consisted of a small-scale survey investigating the respondents' perception of Uzbekistan and their indication of homeland. The second stage sought to elicit an assessment of Uzbekistan's policy towards the Uzbek population living outside of Uzbekistan. The survey results are reported below.[7]

Survey Results

I asked respondents to indicate what they perceived to be their homeland [rodina]. The options available on the questionnaire were: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, city, region, and other (blank space for respondents to specify his/her option).[8]. Kyrgyzstan was indicated by exactly half of the respondents (50%), whereas Uzbekistan was considered as homeland by 3.7%, far less than those considering their own city as homeland (36%). A marginal percentage of the respondents indicated the region as their homeland (4.4%), and 5.9% chose other options.[9] I found no significant association between the responses and demographic variables (sex, age, etc.), except for the location. The analysis shows an urban/rural divide,[10] where urban dwellers appear more inclined than the rural residents to consider Kyrgyzstan as their homeland, while respondents from the outskirts of cities are more likely to consider their city as homeland.

Having established that only a small portion of the sample considered Uzbekistan as their homeland, I examined the meanings Uzbeks attach to the word "Uzbekistan." The survey asked respondents to indicate briefly what Uzbekistan meant to them. I explored this question further through follow-up individual interviews. Twenty-five respondents (46.2%) indicated that Uzbekistan is "a neighboring country," without adding any further comment. Sixteen (29%) considered Uzbekistan as their (ethnic) homeland, in remarkable contrast with the responses to the earlier question. Six respondents (11.1%) added comments, some negative (critical of Uzbekistan's leadership), and some positive (emphasizing achievements in the post-independence era).[11] The segment of the Uzbek population that assumed a more critical stance toward the Uzbek government in Tashkent was young men, predominantly students, journalists, and teachers. Alluding to the tight Uzbek border policy and visa regime, Uzbekistan's "lack of hospitality" was a common theme. The younger generation was also more likely to be critical of Uzbekistan's regional politics. Incidents between Uzbek border guards and police, and the latter's incursions in Kyrgyzstani territory are recurrent. Shootings and incidents of deaths at the border deeply affect the local population. Most lamentable is the fact that it is impossible to visit relatives across the border even for weddings and funerals. Visa requirements and related expenses have had an impact not only on the practicalities of living at the border, but on its perceptions as well.

The second phase of the study looked at Uzbek views of Uzbekistani-Kyrgyzstani relations from a different angle. Respondents were asked to express their views on Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. The choice of elites as respondents seems here particularly appropriate: they have more influence at the political level as they are involved with local, state, and possibly Uzbekistani authorities. They also have resources to frame the perceptions of common people. I asked the respondents to comment on two inter-related topics: first, to identify and assess Uzbekistan's policy to defend the interests of the Uzbek population living in the Kyrgyz Republic; and second, to indicate which institutions they expected to defend or support Uzbek interests.

Data appear to be in line with the findings of the earlier questions on perceptions of Uzbekistan. About seven out of ten respondents (69.5%) noted that Uzbekistan does not defend or support the interests of Uzbek co-ethnics in Kyrgyzstan. Approximately one in ten of the respondents (13.4%) shared the opposite view. The respondents' views on Uzbekistan's policy were more mixed. About one in three respondents (37.8%) saw no difference in the impact Uzbekistan's policy might have on Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. One in four (25%) viewed Uzbekistan's policy as having a fall-out, and 17% of the respondents gave positive evaluations.

Finally, I asked the respondents' opinion on who should be responsible for defending the interests of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan. Not a single respondent indicated Uzbekistan as an actor to defend the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, more than half (56.6%) of the respondents expressed the view that Kyrgyzstani institutions should be defending the interests of the Uzbek population (as a national minority). According to 20.3% of the respondents, it should be a duty of all citizens of the republic to defend the interests of the Uzbek minority. Uzbek organizations, such as the "Republican Uzbek National-Cultural Center" and the "Society of Uzbeks," are not highly regarded, and are not expected by many to accomplish this role (10.1%). International organizations are also given only marginal consideration (8.0%).

Preliminary Findings

The respondents show a rather "disenchanted" view of Uzbekistan. While there is a discrepancy between the answers to the questions on the meaning attached to Uzbekistan and the naming of homeland, Uzbekistan does not occupy a central place in the imagination of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. On the contrary, a positive assessment of Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics is rare. The reported systematic refusal by Uzbekistani authorities to strengthen contacts with Uzbek organizations in Kyrgyzstan adds to the difficult relations between the Uzbekistani authorities and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. In conclusion, Uzbek elites do not look at Tashkent for inspiration or support. A comment from an Uzbek deputy at the Jogorku Kenesh in Bishkek serves as an illustration of that. When asked if he thought that Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov had forgotten about Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, his immediate reply was: "Karimov did not forget us. In fact, he never remembered."

References

Bohr, Annette

1998 Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Harrison, Lisa

2001 Political Research: An Introduction. London: Routledge.

Hirschman, Albert O.

1970 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

International Crisis Group

2002 Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential. Asia Report 33, April 4.

Jones Luong, Pauline

2002 Institutional Change and Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin

1998 Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Kolstø, Pål

1996 "The new Russian diaspora. An identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet Republics," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 19 (3) 609-639.

1999 Nation Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

2000 Political Construction Sites. Nation-building in Russia and the post-Soviet States. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Laitin, David D.

1998 Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Liu, Morgan

2002 "Recognizing the khan: authority, space, and political imagination among Uzbek men in post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan." PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Megoran, Nicholas W.

2002 "The borders of eternal friendship? The politics and pain of nationalism and identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary, 1999-2000." PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, UK.

Melvin, Neil J.

1995 Russians beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

2000 Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

Zevelev, Igor

2001 Russia and Its New Diasporas. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.

[Contents]

Politics and Public Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Higher Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan

Askat Dukenbaev, Assistant Professor, International and Comparative Politics Department, American University-Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, askatdmail.auk.kg

Research Methodology

The aim of my research is to understand the role of politics in the educational policy of Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the study focuses on reforms in higher education since 1992. I apply a theoretical framework designed to analyze issues of policy origin, adoption, implementation, and outcomes (Levin 2001). With this framework in mind, I focus on the following questions: 1) Origins: Where did particular reform proposals come from? How did they become part of the government agenda, when so many proposals do not? What role did various actors and interests play in the development of reform programs? 2) Adoption: How do policies as finally adopted or made into law differ from those originally proposed? What factors led to changes between proposals and approval? Who supported and proposed various policies, and to what effect? 3) Implementation: What model of implementation, if any, did the government use to put the reforms into practice? What "policy levers" were used to support the reforms? How did universities respond to the reforms? 4) Outcomes: What were the intended and unintended effects of the reforms? How did the reforms affect student outcomes and learning processes at the universities?

To answer these questions, my research has employed semi-structured interviews with key actors at major policy-making institutions of the Kyrgyzstan higher education system, such as the administrative staff of the relevant departments of the Ministry of Education, members and administrative staff of the Committee on Education of the Kyrgyzstan parliament, key staff members of the Department on Social Policy and the Commission for Education and Science in the Presidential Administration, university rectors, members of university administrations in Bishkek, former higher education public servants, university students, and alumni. Obtaining data from administrative agencies and scheduling interviews with high-level policy-makers, especially in the Presidential Administration, constituted the major challenge in the data collection stage. In time, I gained access to all of the above-mentioned institutions and established good working relations with insiders in the administrative units. These ties became very helpful in obtaining documents, such as legislative regulations, statements of policy-makers, and survey results in the field of higher education. In total, I interviewed 25 people from the above-mentioned institutions.

The questionnaire used in the face-to-face interviews contained 15 open-ended questions aimed at 1) understanding the role of a unit in policy initiation, formulation, and implementation; 2) identifying the level, forms, and outcomes of interactions during the policy-making process with outside parties, such as political and administrative bodies, and informal groups; 3) analyzing the cases of politically motivated decisions.

Major Actors in Educational Policy-Making in Kyrgyzstan

Presidential Administration. According to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, all three branches of the government - executive, legislative, and judicial - are responsible for policy-making. In practice, policies are initiated and formulated mainly by the Presidential Administration's Social Policy Department and Commission for Education and Science. For example, President Akaev's statements on education are binding for educational policy institutions and groups, including the Ministry of Education and the Committee on Education in the legislature. Another example is related to the law "On Education," which was signed by President Akaev in 2003 only after the parliament incorporated into law all of his recommendations.

Ministry of Education. Formally, the Ministry of Education - whose major functions include certification, licensing, financing, state education standardizing, and planning - has some autonomy in implementing educational policy. In reality, the President has significant influence on the decision-making process at the Ministry. The level of autonomy seemingly varies from one Minister of Education to another as long as new policies and decisions conform to the broad political aims of the Presidential Administration. For example, two major breakthroughs in educational reform in Kyrgyzstan took place in 1992-1993 and 2001-2002. In both periods, the Ministry of Education was headed by reformist ministers, who had the vision, leadership skills, charisma, and political popularity to introduce significant innovations into the educational system in Kyrgyzstan. Their personal abilities enabled them to secure considerable support (at least at the initial stages of the reforms) from high-level officials, including the President himself. Therefore, during these two periods the Ministry of Education clearly enjoyed higher autonomy from the Presidential Administration, exercised greater authority in policy-making, and cooperated with more societal groups than at any other time.

Committee on Education of the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). Preliminary findings of the research suggest that this Committee's role is limited to legislative functions (initiating, adopting, and amending laws), and the ability to make budgetary allocations for the educational sector while passing the country's state budget, which is very rarely implemented in full. For example, the two new major laws on education - "On the Status of the Teacher" (2001) and "On Education" (2003) - were initiated by members of the Committee. However, they were adopted with "corrections" made by one of the divisions of the Presidential Administration acting hand-in-hand with the government. Currently, the Committee is drafting laws "On Pre-School and School Education," "On Higher and Post-Graduate Education," and it is planning to work on the educational legal code.

Rectors of Higher Education Institutions. Partial delegation of some functions of the Ministry of Education to universities, mainly in managerial and financial matters, is one of the outcomes of educational reform in Kyrgyzstan. Universities also have received the right to determine their internal activities, as long as they correspond to the state standard and general curriculum framework approved by the Ministry. For example, today most universities elect their rectors and can make independent decisions on collection and allocation of funds received from fees for educational services (UNDP 1998: 46). In addition, many local rectors established formal and informal contacts with high-level government decision-makers (e.g., some rectors have been appointed as official advisers to the President), becoming part of the political establishment. As a result, the rectors have become a very powerful and resourceful network that can strongly oppose any innovations - such as creation of a board of trustees, which puts the rector and the university's financial resources under its supervision and control - that might threaten their personal interests and positions.

Politics and Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan: Initial Conclusions

The initial conclusions of my research suggest that the country's educational policy is highly politicized, and has become an important tool in political mobilization, socialization, and state-building. Since independence in 1991, promotion of the cultural values of the "titular" nationality - ethnic Kyrgyz - has become one of the major questions on the political agenda of Kyrgyzstan. The Ministry of Education plays a pivotal role in this process. One of the basic aims of the "State Educational Doctrine" adopted in August 2000 by Presidential decree is to "preserve national cultural traditions" (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 2000). Ratified in 2003, the new law "On Education" also stipulates that educational policy in Kyrgyzstan should be based on the principle of "the priority of universal human values combined with national cultural heritage, upbringing in terms of citizenship, hard work, patriotism, and respect for human rights and liberties" [emphasis added]. The requirement to obtain the Ministry of Education's approval for the university's curriculum is one of the policy implementation tools. Finally, in February 2004 the Ministry of Education issued its decision to introduce a compulsory examination on the history of Kyrgyzstan for all graduating students as of 2004.

Also, university students and their faculty are regularly mobilized for participation in official events, such as presidential elections, referenda, national celebrations, officially organized public meetings, rallies, and conferences. For example, in January 2003 on the eve of the referendum on constitutional amendments, the Ministry of Education delayed the beginning of winter break at the related universities so as to keep students on campuses to be marshaled to the referendum. The Ministry also ordered the universities to set up "groups to clairfy the referendum's goals and purposes, organize talks, discussions, roundtables, and other special events among students and faculty" (Vechernii Bishkek 2003).

Another characteristic of the policy process in higher education is its high degree of centralization restricted to interactions mainly among the four institutions: 1) Presidential Administration, 2) Ministry of Education, 3) Parliament, and 4) major universities. I maintain that a more open and pluralistic policy-making process (with institutionalized involvement of non-governmental groups) is necessary to make the policy decisions more rational and their implementation more effective. Such change, in its turn, requires further liberalization of the political and administrative system of Kyrgyzstan.

Research on this project has been carried out under the framework of the Open Society Institute Higher Education Support Program's Central Asian Research Initiative project (October 2002 to August 2004). Logistical support has been provided by the East-West Center for Research and Intercultural Dialogue of the American University-Central Asia (AUCA) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. One of the final goals of the project is to publish an article on educational policy-making in Kyrgyzstan, and design an undergraduate course entitled "Politics and Bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan" to be offered at the AUCA.

References

Government of the Kyrgyz Republic

2000 Educational Doctrine of the Kyrgyz Republic. Attachment to the Presidential Decree "On state educational doctrine of the Kyrgyz Republic." Bishkek, August 27.

Levin, Benjamin

2001 "Conceptualizing the process of education reform from an international perspective," Educational Policy Analysis, 9 (14), Arizona State University. http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n14.html

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

1998 Kyrgyzstan: National Human Development Report. Bishkek: UNDP.

Vechernii Bishkek

2003 Bishkek, January 24, p. 1.

[Contents]

The Soviet Policy of Economic Nationalization in Uzbekistan and its Consequences, 1917-1940

Nadejda Ozerova, Senior Researcher at the Institute of History, Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Senior Lecturer at the Tashkent Financial Institute, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, nadejda29yandex.ru

This report presents preliminary findings of dissertation research started in 2000 at the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. The research is funded in part by a Central Asia Research Initiative (CARI) grant designed to support the research and teaching interests of young faculty. This study aims to provide a comprehensive examination, through critical analysis and objective evaluation, of the Soviet policy towards private property and its owners in Uzbekistan in the period 1917-1940. The study also investigates the policy's consequences, especially its effect on the democratic rights of citizens. I pay particular attention to the relationship between authorities and private property ownership, and to the status of property owners in Turkestan (and from 1925, in Uzbekistan) in the first decades of Soviet rule.

Since independence Uzbekistan has been driven to reform its society. As part of the reform, economic liberalization has been designed to develop a class of private property owners by reducing the government's regulatory functions, providing more freedom to businesses, strengthening the private sector, and promoting small- and medium-size enterprises. The entirely opposite economic policy of 1917-1940 attracted the interest not only of historians, but also economists and other social scientists (Nepomnin 1957, Ul'masov 1960, Aminova 1963, Alimov 1974, Golovanov 1992). From 1917 to 1940, the Communist Party's positions on "class enemies," elimination of private property in the means of production, and creation of communal property determined Soviet economic policy. The implementation of this policy was possible only through the forcible alienation of the means of production from private property owners, and the eradication of the prosperous strata of society.

Favorable conditions for objective historical analysis and reevaluation of history emerged only after Uzbekistan's independence in 1991. Many previously closed archives were opened and scholars received access to the works of foreign researchers. Since independence many studies contributing to the formulation of an accurate history of Uzbekistan have been published (e.g., Golovanov 1992; Aminova 1993, 1995, 2000; Shamsutdinov 2001). However, my research is the first comprehensive study of economic "nationalization" in 1917-1940.

The commonly accepted methods of historical inquiry form the basis of my research, which is shaped by the concept of national independence with its preference for humanistic values. The research pays significant attention to archival materials from the Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the State Archives of Tashkent, the State Archives of Tashkent Province, and the State Archives of Samarqand Province. Brochures, decrees, and orders issued by the ruling authorities, as well as responses of various social groups in the form of letters, complaints, and direct actions have exceptional value. During archival work I traced private property owners' civil rights records. I am interested in determining how well the property owners' economic and other civil rights were observed.

Along with archival documents, I also studied published materials, such as monographs and multi-volume histories. I compared formerly unavailable archival documents with published materials using critical-analytical, comparative-historical, and logical methods of inquiry. I use three guiding principles. First, I use the principle of historicism, examining documents within their historical context. Second, I use the objectivity principle, which directs historians to examine the facts apart from a priori arguments or pre-established conceptions. I study both positive and negative sides of events independent of my personal attitude towards them. Third, I approach social history through the prism of individual and social interests, considering the motivations of each social group. I hold that such a multi-layered approach produces the best analysis by creating an accurate picture of events, examining consequences, and revealing the influences of policies on different strata of society and on individuals as well.

The most difficult task in carrying out this research is to deal with the discrepancies between the statistics reported in the archival documents and those in published materials. The discrepancies appeared due to pressure by the Soviet authorities to readjust statistics to fit predetermined schemes. In such cases, I assign priority to the archival documents, and proceed with their systematization and deep data analysis.

Research Findings

This research reveals that economic reforms in Turkestan began with the nationalization of factories and workshops. Following the metropole's interests, nationalization covered primarily industries associated with cotton. On February 26, 1918 the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) of Turkestan issued a decree confiscating all cotton processing in the region, and pronouncing it the property of the workers-and-peasants' government. The decree also indicated that, "in case of resistance by owners, they should be subject to drastic measures right up to immediate execution by shooting." Following the cotton industry, the food oil industry was nationalized at the end of March 1918 through the same repressive method.

It should be noted that foreign entrepreneurs established a number of enterprises in Turkestan, such as the Belgian "Tashkent Tram" and the American "Singer Company." In December 1918, ignoring all the norms of international law, the Bolshevik government declared them nationalized. From 1917 to 1918, 330 enterprises of the leading industries in Turkestan were transferred into the hands of the Soviet authorities. By the end of 1919 more than 700 enterprises were nationalized.

During the nationalization process, Turkestani leaders did not take into account the interests of the peoples in the region, and did not consider the economic viability of their actions. After nationalization, the leadership failed to organize properly the operations of nationalized enterprises. An overwhelming majority of the nationalized enterprises, especially the cotton-cleaning factories, remained idle as they lacked raw materials, fuel, funding, personnel, and customers. The employees of these enterprises left their jobs en masse. The property of nationalized enterprises was stolen and damaged. As of January 1, 1921, the Central Council of the National Economy (CCNE) of Turkestan controlled 861 enterprises, including 405 that were not operational.

Nationalization failed to produce any clearly positive economic results. Instead, it led to a decline in production in a number of industries. In 1920 the total production output in the Turkestan region was 80% lower than in 1914. The general economic crisis in the Soviet Union, the worsening political situation, and fear of losing power forced the Bolsheviks to adopt the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Some of the principal elements of NEP were replacement of the surplus-requisitioning system (prodrazverstka), i.e., forcible requisitioning of food products, by a tax in kind; legalization of commerce; private initiative in manufacturing, services and crafts; and partial restoration of market regulation mechanisms. In the countryside, following the transition to the tax in kind the government leadership tried to raise production through state-controlled land leasing, and by establishing production contracts with small farmers (dehqons). In some regions, these measures created stable conditions for farming. However, this "democratization" of the economy had a superficial and ambiguous character. Only the light- and small-scale processing industries grew, while benefit to small farms was artificially restrained. Furthermore, the political monopoly of the Bolshevik Party remained. The one-party dictatorship held the levers of the economy in one hand and free private business in the other hand, resulting in irreconcilable contradictions.

Despite positive results and economic stabilization, NEP was rejected because it threatened to break the monopoly and dictatorship of the one-party system. The Communist Party leadership viewed such an outcome as unacceptable. The breakdown of NEP at the end of the 1920s resulted in the full nationalization of agriculture and manufacturing. After NEP, Soviet economic policy called for rapid industrialization and forced collectivization. Its purpose was to eliminate the multi-structured economy, nationalize all forms of ownership, re-distribute property, and implement the principles of total egalitarianism. A war was waged against private property owners ending with the victory of the government. Under the state's monopoly on property ownership, people were moved further away from property ownership, product management, public production planning, profit distribution, and other key functions.

Previous studies examined various stages of Soviet economic policy in Central Asia, including War Communism (1918-1920), the New Economic Policy (1920s), and collectivization and industrialization (1930s) in isolation. This research is the first of its kind as it conducts a comprehensive examination of Soviet economic policy in Uzbekistan in the period 1917-1940. My intention is to close gaps in the historiography of Central Asia by revealing the mistakes of nationalization and its effects on different social strata. The individual is the main subject of my study. It was the fate of individuals who were successful entrepreneurs and farmers to suffer at the hands of the government and its ideology. A retrospective analysis of this controversial period allows me to identify the mistakes and obstacles on the path of economic reform, and I hope this will help my country to avoid them in the future.

References

Alimov, I.

1974 Uzbekskoe dekhkanstvo na puti k sotsializmu [Uzbek Dehqons on the Path to Socialism]. Tashkent: Uzbekistan.

Aminova, R. X.

1963 Agrarnaia politika sovetskoi vlasti v Uzbekistane (1917-1920) [Agricultural Policy of Soviet Power in Uzbekistan (1917-1920)]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

1993 Istoriia sovkhozov Uzbekistana, 1917-1960. Opyt, problemy, uroki [History of Sovkhozes of Uzbekistan, 1917-1960. Experience, Problems, Lessons]. Tashkent: Fan.

1995 Vozvrashchaias' k istorii kollektivizatsii v Uzbekistane [Returning to the History of Collectivization in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Fan.

2000 Turkestan v nachale XX veka: k istorii istokov natsional'noi nezavisimosti [Turkestan in the Early XXth Century: A History of the Origins of National Independence]. Tashkent: Fan.

Golovanov, A.

1992 Krest'ianstvo Uzbekistana: evoliutsiia sotsial'nogo polozheniia (1917-1937) [The Peasantry of Uzbekistan: Evolution of Social Status (1917-1937)]. Tashkent: Fan.

Nepomnin, V. Ia.

1957 Ocherki sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva v Uzbekistane [Studies in Socialist Construction in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

1960 Istoricheskii opyt stroitel'stva sotsializma v Uzbekistane [The Historical Experience of Constructing Socialism in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Gosizdat Uzbekskoi SSR.

Ul'masov, A.

1960 Natsionalizatsiia promyshlennosti v sovetskom Turkestane [Nationalization of Industry in Soviet Turkestan]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

Shamsutdinov, R.

2001 O'zbekistonda sovetlarning quloqlashtirish siyosati va uning fojeali oqibatlari [Soviet Policy of De-kulakization in Uzbekistan and Its Tragic Consequences]. Toshkent: Sharq.

[Contents]

Reviews and Abstracts

Anke von Kügelgen, Agirbek Muminov, and Michael Kemper, eds., Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia, vol. 3: Arabic, Persian and Turkic Manuscripts (15th-19th Centuries). Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2000. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 233. ii + 571 pp., bibliography, index. ISBN 3879972869, €50.00.

Reviewed by: Devin DeWeese, Professor of Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., USA, deweeseindiana.edu

Serious, historically-grounded research on the regions where Muslim civilization has intersected with Russian and Soviet power finds some of its best representatives today in German scholarship, unburdened by the gross imbalance regrettably imposed on Central Asian or "Central Eurasian" studies in the United States by the preponderance of support for (and hence the production of) scholarly work that is supposedly relevant for policymakers (with deleterious results for both scholarship and policy). German scholarship has yielded both impressive monographic studies and significant cooperative projects enlisting the work of some of the finest scholars from the former Soviet world. The volume under review is the final offering in a series of three collections of articles on previously under-explored aspects of Muslim culture in imperial Russia and Central Asia. The first two were published in 1996 and 1998, and focused more narrowly on the 18th to early 20th centuries. The third, like its predecessors, marks an important and substantial contribution to scholarship, and the three volumes together have opened up a host of new perspectives on the foundations of current developments in the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union.

This volume includes ten contributions (eight in German, one in Russian, and one in English), of widely varying lengths, by an outstanding international group of scholars with a deep and direct knowledge of the Islamic manuscript traditions of Central Asia, the Volga-Ural region, and the North Caucasus. Most involve both the translation and edition (or facsimile publication), with extensive annotation and commentary, of previously unpublished and largely unstudied texts, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkic, and most have been brought to scholarly attention for the first time through this volume. The focus on manuscript sources is particularly important in view of the overwhelming concentration of much previous scholarship on "Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia" upon printed material. The use of printing was in general more attractive to the least traditional elements in Muslim societies, who were often the most unrepresentative of the interests, tastes, and aspirations of their communities (even if they claimed to be their spokesmen), and Western scholarship's emphasis on those who presented their Western-influenced ideas in Western-influenced media has inevitably yielded a skewed understanding of the real concerns of most Muslims under Russian rule, with unfortunate consequences that persist today. It may be said, indeed, that the neglect of the enormous body of material produced and surviving in manuscript form, from the Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia lies at the heart of fundamental misunderstandings about Islam in those regions, both during the Soviet era and more recently, that have bedeviled the many "Sovietological" treatments of Islam in the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet environments.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to Central Asia, which is the focus of the first seven contributions, with the sixth presenting, in effect, a Volga-Ural perspective on Central Asia. In the first article, Jürgen Paul (Halle) edits and translates a brief discussion of the legitimacy of the vocal zikr, an issue central to Sufi practice and communal identity since the 13th century, with important political and social ramifications as well, composed by the eminent "theorist" of the Naqshbandi order, Khoja Muhammad Parsa (d. 822/1420). Next, Oleg F. Akimushkin (St. Petersburg) edits and translates a brief Persian treatise, by a 16th-century shaykh from a Central Asian Kubravi lineage, on the principles of mystical practice. Florian Schwarz (Bochum) presents a Persian poem on the Kubravi silsila, or "chain" of mystical transmission, by another 16th-century master, the son of Husayn Khwarazmi, the most important Kubravi shaykh of Central Asia in that era. These two contributions mark the first significant publications of texts produced within the Kubravi Sufi tradition in 16th-century Central Asia, and thus offer essential material for the larger project of understanding the religious history, and hence the religious present, of Central Asia.

The fourth contribution, by Baxtiyar M. Babazanov [Babajanov] (Tashkent), provides a well-annotated Russian translation of a remarkable Sufi treatise, in Chaghatay Turkic, written early in the 19th century in Khorezm. The only complete manuscript copy of the work, copied in 1925 and preserved in Tashkent, is reproduced in facsimile. Entitled Khalvat-i sufiha, the anonymous work was prompted by a ritual gathering of Sufis in Khiva in 1813 convened by Qutluq Murad Biy, the powerful amir and elder brother of Eltuzer (the first khan of the Khorezmian Qonghrat dynasty). The work offers unparalleled insights into the history of Sufi communities in Khorezm (on which considerable misinformation is still in circulation in Sovietological works).

Next, in the volume's longest contribution, Anke von Kügelgen (Bern) analyzes a series of letters written by an important Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi shaykh, Miyan Fail Ahmad, to the Manghit ruler of Bukhara, Amir Haydar (r. 1800-1825), on a wide range of religious issues; the contents are summarized, with some texts presented partly in paraphrase and partly in translations. Both the material itself and von Kügelgen's exemplary analysis will be invaluable for tracing the various "reformist" currents, and their political implications, that took shape in the Central Asian khanates well before the Western-inspired Jadidist movement made its appearance under Russian tutelage. A different perspective on the religious situation in the Khanate of Bukhara during the early 19th century is presented in the contribution of Michael Kemper (Bochum), which offers an edition and translation of an early Arabic work by the famous Volga-Ural Muslim scholar, Shihab ad-Din Marjani (d. 1889), focused on the religious disputes of the latter's compatriot, Abu Nasr al-Qursavi (d. 1812), with the ulama of Bukhara. This article adds to Kemper's earlier studies of Marjani's religious writings, which, taken together, have offered important correctives to our understanding of this figure's life and works, beyond the often one-dimensional presentations embedded in nationalist appropriations of his legacy.

In the seventh piece, Agirbek K. Muminov (Tashkent) edits and translates one of the many genealogical texts (nasab-nama) he and his colleagues have uncovered in recent years outlining the "sacred history" and familial traditions of the Khoja groups among the Qazaqs [Kazakhs] of the Syr Darya basin. The Khoja phenomenon is an important aspect of social and religious life throughout Central Asia, but remains poorly understood, and the term is still often the subject of a ludicrous confusion with hajji in the Sovietological literature. The version presented here is in Persian, and is preceded by an invaluable discussion of the corpus of such genealogical texts collected so far. Muminov's extensive notes to his translation likewise help make accessible the data from many other versions of these texts. The Volga-Ural region is represented in the contribution, in English, of Allen J. Frank (Maryland), who presents, in edition and translation, a substantial excerpt from an extraordinary work of "local history" preserved in a unique manuscript in Kazan. The work, entitled Tavarikh-i Alti Ata, was completed in 1910 by Muhammad-Fatih b. Ayyub al-Ilmini, and outlines a geographical and historical vision of a small part of the Volga-Ural Islamic community. Frank has also published a detailed study of this work's contents in his Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia, but this article is valuable for its presentation of extended portions of the text itself. The work represents the outlook, on the eve of the revolutionary changes in imperial Russia, of an educated Muslim who was neither unaffected by or resistant to the changes of that era, nor enamored of the responses to them shaped by Russian education and culture - for example, he writes of a Jadid school in his area closing for lack of interest (p. 462) - and whose understanding of his own community was self-confident enough to be self-critical. As such, it offers an excellent example of the kind of literary production that will be missed by those who assume that only printed material could be representative of significant written culture in this period, and of the kind of thought and worldview that is so often missed because of the inordinate attention in Sovietological and post-Soviet nationalist circles devoted to the handful of Jadidist reformers active in the same era.

Finally, two much shorter contributions represent the North Caucasus. First, Rukiya Sharafutdinova (St. Petersburg) edits and translates two Arabic letters (the first by the famous "Imam Shamil") from the 1830s; the letters reflect not only the struggles of this era between Russian troops and the local Muslim population, but internal tensions within the Muslim community as well. The final piece is a facsimile publication and translation by Aleksandra N. Kozlova (Makhachkala) of a 16th-century Persian document reflecting Safavid control over the principalities of southern Daghestan; it may serve as a reminder that Iranian interests in the regions of the "Russian borderlands" are not merely the product of the post-Soviet era.

The contributions are all of the highest scholarly quality, and the editors have done an excellent job of standardizing transliterations and references. The facsimiles are clear and legible, and both the printed Arabic-script texts and the Russian, German, and English texts are well produced, with relatively few typographical errors. It is worth underscoring here, finally, the value of the material presented in this volume for illuminating the vast world of Muslim culture as affected by Russian and Soviet rule, that remains hidden to readers more familiar with Soviet, Sovietological, nationalist, or policy-dominated studies of the relevant regions. It is hoped that such readers, instead of dismissing the volume's focus on manuscript sources as hopelessly arcane or being put off by its Arabic-script text and facsimiles, or ignoring it because it fails to deliver the concise platitudes on Islam that fill much existing work on the subject, will recognize that manuscript sources such as those explored in this volume are in fact the key repository of the traditions of Muslims in the regions in question' and often provide the only possible link between what came before the Soviet era's impact on Islam, and what has come to the fore since the end of Soviet antireligious campaigns. A dramatic improvement of our understanding of Islam in Central Asia and elsewhere in the former Soviet world is now especially urgent. The steady stream of superficial works on Islam in the Soviet and post-Soviet environments shows all too clearly that such improvement will not come from within the circles that have produced and consumed those works for several decades, but must come instead from the sort of work represented by the three fine volumes of Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia.

References

Frank, Allen J.

2001 Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910. Leiden: Brill.

[Contents]

Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 240 pp., illustrations. ISBN 0415297443 (cloth), $75.00.

Reviewed by: Gulnar Kendirbai, Fulbright Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York, USA, gk2020columbia.edu

This is a story about the failure of one colonial endeavor, namely the attempt by Tsarist Russia to incorporate its remote Asiatic colony, Turkestan, within its imperial structures. This story is framed by a second story dealing with the 1916 Revolt in Central Asia, which serves as both evidence and outcome of this failure. Russian Turkestan, the annexation of which began with the conquest of Tashkent in 1865 by General Cherniaev, was to become Russia's ambitious colonial project. Russian

CESR Central Eurasian Studies Review

Contents of this issue

Perspectives

Research Reports

Reviews and Abstracts

Conferences and Lecture Series

Educational Resources and Developments

Editors - CESR Vol. 3 No. 2

Perspectives

Eurasian Studies in Turkey

Academic Studies

Research Centers

Policy Research

Conclusion

Research Reports

Narratives of Migration and Kazakh Identity

References

Uzbek Communities in the Kyrgyz Republic and Their Relationship to Uzbekistan

Research Content, Questions, and Methods

Survey Results

Preliminary Findings

References

Politics and Public Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Higher Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan

Research Methodology

Major Actors in Educational Policy-Making in Kyrgyzstan

Politics and Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan: Initial Conclusions

References

The Soviet Policy of Economic Nationalization in Uzbekistan and its Consequences, 1917-1940

Research Findings

References

Reviews and Abstracts

References

CESR
Central Eurasian Studies Review